The Dispute
The dispute on Kalabagh Dam has raged between the four provinces of Pakistan since 1984 when the proposal left the drawing boards of WAPDA and surfaced for the public to see and debate. Punjab, where the Dam is located favours the project for the professed reason that the country needs electric power and the Kalabagh Dam will provide 3,600 MW of the energy. An additionally reason cited is the urgent need to store more water to compensate for the strage capacity being lost due to the fast silting up of the Tarbela and MAngla dams. What is not always declared however, and has only been drudgingly released for public knowledge, is the Punjab wishes to irrigate 380,000 acres of land (146,000 ha) on both banks of Mianwali, Khushad &Jhelum districts through a canal off taking from the left Bank High Level Outlet Works of KBD that will draw 15,000 cusecs of water from the KBD reservoir. The same canal will also meet water shortages in the Mangla command area before discharging into the Jhelum River upstream of Rasul Barrage. Yet another 15,000 cusecs canal is proposed to be tapped from the Right Bank of the dam that will irrigate 2.12 million acres in the Kurram Basin of D.I.Khan.
NWFO objects to the dam primarily because of a sizeable number of its people will be displaced, and vast area of its lands and services will be submerged under the reservoir. River Indus does not touch the province of Balochistan therefore it is not directly affected, but its still objects that its share of water, already very low, will be further reduced. However it is the province of Sindh which as lower riparian has constantly felt threatened by Punjab and has bitterly disputed the figures of water availability advanced by Punjab and WAPDA citing legal, economic, ecological, geomorphological, and many other reason for opposing Kalabagh Dam.
So acute have been the differences between Punjab and Sindh over the sharing of the water of Indus river system that no less than 6 commissions have deliberated up on an equitable appropriation of the waters between both provinces :-
1. Anderson Commission 1935
2. The Indus Commision (Also Known As Rao Commission) 1941
3. Akhter Hussain Committee 1968
4. Indus Waters Committee (Also known as Fazle Akber Committee1970
5. Anwarul Haq Commission (Aborted) 1981
6. Haleem Commission 1983
And with the notable exception of Rao Commission of 1941, so wide has been the difference in the perception of both provinces about their rightful share of water and so acrimonious the debate, that Justice Fazle Akber was constrained to write “ it is regrettable that the members of the committee failed to work out any recommendations for the apportionment of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries among the four provinces in West Pakistan. Unfortunately the lack of agreement was not restricted only to the question of apportionment; even on purely technical issues the members had generally failed to agree amongst themselves. I therefore had no other alternate but to formulate my own recommendations for the President”.(13)
The bitterness continues till date as Justice Fazle Akber had written, not over the apportionment of water alone but right down to technical matters. Kalabagh Dam is only one unresolved water related issue among many. For example The technical committee on Water Resources (TCWR) set up by General Musharraf that submitted its report in Aug 2005 and had eight members, two from each province, beside the chairman, MIR ANG Abassi (14), could not agree on almost all issues. The TCWR had the advantage of the presentations and bast data available with wapda, IRSA (Indus River System Authority), the Ministries of water and Power and of planning Department but even it could not agree on as simple a technical matter as the guantum of water available in the system. The seven members, two each from Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan and a non-Sindhi member from Sindh had one opinion, the other member from Sindh the second, Wapda is Augures individual the 3rd opinion and the Chairman had the fourth opinion.
Before 1859 when the first man made canal, upper Bari Doab, was drawn from Ravi by the British, cultivation on Indus Basin was only possible through lifting water from inundation canals (for example east and west Nara, Phulleli) and from subsoil reservoir and a few miles of primitives canals made by previous rulers. Surface water irrigation was possible only in the case of rain fed (Barani) lands and those areas around rivers that were left moist, like Katcho, due to overflowing rivers in summer season. Out of the two sowing season abundant water was available for Kharif (sowing April, May) while in Rabi (sowing November, December) there was always shortage due to sources of water freezing in Himalayas.
Realising the scope of mischief the subject of water could play between various provinces of India, the British set up India Irrigation Commission (1901 - 1903) that, among other things ordered Punjab to obtain assent of Sindh before undertaking projects concerning water of the Indus River System. The Government of India Act 1919 made it mandatory that all disputes of water between Sindh and Punjab provinces be decided by the Viceroy of India.
A “Cotton Committee” was set up in 1919 and it reported the same year that Punjab should not be allocated water from Indus till the effects of construction of the proposed Sukker Barrage had not become evident.
In September 1919 government of Punjab presented Thal project as against Sukker Barrage project which was rejected outright by the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford.
The Sukker Barrage project was conceived by Chief Engineer Sindh, Mr. A.A.Musto and the project was approved by The government of India in July 1923. The barrage was commissioned nine years later in July 1932.
But immediately after the work had started on Sukker Barrage, Punjab in Sept 1925 once again presented its Thal project to government of India. Once again it was rejected, this time by Viceroy Lord Reading, who cited grievous injustice to the interests of the lower riparian as reason for rejection of that project.
The water dispute between Sindh and Punjab had b this time reached such proportion that government of India was forced to constitute an eight member committee, under Chief Engineer of UP, Mr. Anderson. The report of Anderson Committee was presented to the government of India on 16th Sept 1935 which accepted all its recommendations in a letter issued on 30th March 1937.
The terms of reference of Anderson Committee were:
1. The extent to which additional supplies of water are actually required for (a) the Khaipur State; (b) The Bahawalpur State; (c) the Haveli Project.
2. The possibility of finding such supplies without detriment to the parties interested in the waters of the Indus and its tributaries and the effect upon the existing or prospective rights of those parties of any fresh withdrawals, the authorization of which the committee may recommend.
The Sindh government did not agree with the recommendations of Anderson Committee and again took its case to the Government of India, which on 11th September 1941 set up another commission under MR. B.N.Rao, Judge of Culcutta High Court, with instructions to find a lasting solution for the continuing water dispute between the two provinces. The commission studied the complaints of Sindh and the rebuttals of Punjab and came out with an exhaustive “Report of the Indus Commission” which became the basis of deliberations between the Governments of Sindh and Punjab.
1. The extent to which additional supplies of water are actually required for (a) the khairpur State: (b) the Bahawalpur State: (c) the Haveli Project.
2. The possibility of finding such supplies without detriment to the parties interested in the waters of the Indus and its tributaries and the effect upon the existing or prospective rights of those parties of any fressh withrawals, the authorization of which the committee may recommend.
The Sindh Government did not agree with the recommendations of Anderson Committee and again took its case to the Government of India, which on 11 th Septermbe 1941 set up another commissin under Mr. B.N.Rao, Judge of Calcutta High Court, with instruction to find a lasting solution for the continuing water dispute between the two provinces. The commission studied the complaints of Sindh and the rebuttals of Punjab and came out with an exhaustive “Report of the Indus Commision” which became the basis of deliberation between the Governments of Sindh and Punjab.
The rerms of reference of the Rao Commission are as under:
COMPLAINT OF SINDH AND PROJECTS COMPLAINED OF: This is a complaint by the Government of Sindh under section 130 of the Government of India Act 1935. The complaint relates to certain irrigation projects constructed or contemplated by the Government of the Punjab on the Indus and its tributaries. These projects, as set out in paragraphs 3, 4 and 28 of Sindh,s printed complaint, part-I, are:
1. The Haveli project -------------------- already in operation:
2. The Thal project -------------------- under construction:
3. The Bhakra Dam project ----------- in contermplation:
4. 24 storage reservioirs with an assumed capacity of 500,000 acres-feet (1 acre-foot= 43,560 cubic feet) each, on the effluents of the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas: and
5. Feeders to transfer water (subject to certain conditions) from the Ravi to the Beas and from the Chenab to the Beas with a total assumed withdrawal of 23,000 cusects (1 cusec= 1 cubic foot per second or about 2 cre-feet per day) at its highest-said to be in conteplation (15)
Relying heavily on international law, especially American law, which had experienced many inter-state disputes of water, the Rao Commission based its recommendation on three principles:
1. No province/state can be given and entirely free hand in respect of a common source of water such as an inter provincial/state river.
2. Works executed in the territory of one province/state require the consent of another, if they injuriously affect the interests of the latter.
3. In a dispute of appropriation of water from the same stream, the one first in time is superior in right
The deliberation between the Governments of Sindh and Punjab started in April 1943 and concluded in a Draft Agreement on 28th September, 1945. Known as Sindh-Punjab Agreement 1945, signed by Chief Engineers of both provinces on behalf of their respective governments, the Draft Agreement settled the thorny issue of apportionment of water of Indus and its tributaries, laying down the broad principles of settling disputes that were vven likely to arise in future.
In a letter to the Government of Sindh, Government of Punjab, through its secretary (public Works, Lrrigation Branch) accepted the Draft Agreement. Its only objection was on the amount o Rs 20 million that the Rao Commission had recommended Punjab to pay to Sindh against the cost of 120 million for building 2 barrages in Sindh (16)
Unfortunately, the political events in the subcontinent overtook all other busincess of governance soon after, and the Sindh Punjab agreement was never ratified by the two provincial legislatures. Howvever it remains the only agreement ever that was agreed upon by the governments of Sindh and Punjab and for this reason the recommendations of Rao Commission continue to be considered credible till date and have been acted upon till as late as 1990. (17)
A complex and very harmful dimensin was added to the water dispute betwenn Sindh and Punjab when water of 3 rivers, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, was lost to India.
Sir Simon Radcliff, after he drew the faterful red line separating pakistan from India, formed a Division of Assets Committee, also known as committee B, that consisted of officials from each government department, one from either side, to oversee the difficulties arising out of the Partition. An Arbitral Tribunal headed by the chief justice of India was also set up to adjusticate on matters that could not be resdved in the Division of Assets Committee.
The life of both committees was fixed till 31st March 1948 by which time ti was expected that complication arising out of the division of assets and liabilities of each government department would be over.
The West Punjab secretary of irrigation S.I.Mehboob was nominated on Committee B. Since Ferozepur Head Works on river Sutlej was to be in India and tis Dipalpur canal as flowing through pakistan and similarly, since Madhupur Head Works was to remain in India while Central Bari Doab canal flowing from it was crossing over into pakistan and both canals could easily be closed, S.I.Mehboob succeeded in getting the tricky matter fixed on the agenda of Committee B.
When the matter was fixed for discussion by the committee, government of pakistan committed a grave mistake by nominating khan bahadur shaikh abdul Hameed, onother secretary irrigation form Punjab, in place of S.I.Mehboob.
Incredibly Mr.Kanwar Sen the Indian nominee persuaded K.B Sheikh abdul Hameed to withdraw the apportionment of water from the agenda of Committee B altogether!!
It is asaid that Kanwar Sen was an old colleague of K.B. Sheikh Abdul Hameed in combined India and played upon the intensive rivalry between Hameed and S.I.Mehboob (18)
India allowed both canals to flow to the brim till exactly 31st March 1948 when the life of Committee B and the Arbitral Tribunal ended. On 1st April 1948 both canals were effectively closed and all hell broke loose in Punjab.
Ghulam Mohammed the finance minister of Pakistan accompanied by Mumtaz Daultana and Shoukat Hayat Khan and a few officials from West Punjab rushed to Dehli to plead with Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the Indian premier. Mr.Nehru informed the harried delegates that by removing the apportionment of water from the agenda of committee B, Pakistan had in principle accepted Indian right over the of water of Sutlej and Ravi. He demanded monetary compensation to allow the now Indian waters to flow into Pakistan.
Pakistan Government committed the 2nd, and immensely bigger, mistake of allowing its delegates to sign the agreement in on 4th May 1948 in Delhi, as mentioned by Choudhry Mohammed Ali in which they agreed to pay compensation, or seigniorage charges, to India.
Choudhry Mohammad Ali in his book, The Emergence of Pakistan (19) narrates this episode as under:-
“Despite the fact that the Radcliffe Award had placed the control of headworks vital for pakistan in the hands of India, the West Punjab government remained content because of the agreement reached by Committee B and the Punjab Partition Committee, that the prepartition shares of water would not be varied. No formal document specifying the precise shares of East Punjab and West punjab in irrigation waters was drawn up and signed. The West punjab ministers and officials felt assured by the repeated declarations of their counterparts in East Punjab that there was no question of any change in the prepartition arrangements for canal waters. The same declaration were also made by the East Punjab respresentatives beiore the Arbitral Tribunal, when the sisputed question of the valuation of the canal system came up for a hearing. Actually, as events showed, the East punjab ministers and officials were planning a deadly blow against pakistan and were lulling the West punjab government to sleep with swee\et words. They were waiting for the day when the life of the Arbitral Tribunal would come to an end on March 31, 1948. On the side of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity. On the part of West Punjab there was neglect of duty, complacency, and lack of common prudence --- which had disastrous consequences for pakistan.
On April 1, 1948, the day after the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, the East punjab government cut off water supplies in every canal crossing into pakistan. These consisted of the Central Bari Doab canal system, the Dipalpur canal system, and the Bahawalpur state distributary. Of this action, Sir patrick Spens, Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunl, said before the joint meeting in London of the East India Association and the Overseas League on February 23, 1955:
I remember very well suggesting whether it was not desirable that some order should be made about the continued flow of water,
… But we were invited by both the Attorney-Generals [of India and pakistan] to come to our decision on the basis that there ould be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water, and the award which my colleagues made, in which I had no part, they made on that basis. Our awards were published at the end of March, 1948. I am going to say nothing more about it except that I was very much upset that almost within a day or two there was a grave interference with the flow of water on the basis of which our awards had been made.”
As soon as the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, all promises made before it by the representative of India that “there would be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water” were forgotten and water was shut off from pakistan canals on which the irrigation of 1.66 million acres depended. East Punjab now contended that Pakistan had no right to any water and demanded seigniorage charges as a condition for reopening the canals, There was acute distress which, ith every day that passed, became more and more intolerable. In large areas where the subsoil water is brackish there was no drinking water. Millions of People faced the ruin of their crops, the loss of their heards, and ventual starvation due to lack of water.
Under these distressful circumstances, a delegation was sent from pakistan to Delhi in the beginning of May, 1948, to seek a solution to the problem. The delegation was led by Ghulam mhammad, the Finance Minister of pakistan, and included two ministers from west Punjab – Shaukat Hayat khan and Mumtaz Daultana. At the meetings in Delhi, East Punjab resresentatives insisted that they would not restore the flow of water to the canals unless West punjab ac-knowledged that it had no right to the water. To this the representatives of West punjab could not agree.The pakistan proposal that the two governments should submit their differences to the arbitration of the International Court of Justice was not acceptble 1, India. There was an impasse. Ghulam Muhammad appealed to Mountbatten who consulted with Nehru. A statement was then placed before Ghulam Muhammad, and he was asked to sign it without changing a word or a comma – a condition for restoring the flow of water.
On May 4, 1948 thestatement was signed by Ghulam Muhammad and the two west punjab ministers on the one hand and by nehru and two East punjab ministers on the other. The statement declared that, apart from the question of law involved, the governments were anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit. The East punjab government would progressively diminish its supply to the central Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals in West punjab in order to give reasonable time to the West punjab government to tap alternative sources. The statement announced that water was being restored to these canals, that west punjab was to deposit in esorow such “ad hoc sum as may be specified by the prime Minister of India” to cover certain disputed payments, and that after an examination by each side of the legal and other issues invlved, futher Meetings would take place. In conclusion, the Dominion governments expressed the hope that a friendly solution would be reached.
Though India restored the flo of water to the Dipalpur canal and the principal branches of the Central Bari Doab canals, water was still withheld from the Balawalpur state distributary and nine lesser distributaries of the Central Bari Doab system. Eventually considerable areas in Bahawalpur state reverted to desert Notwithstanding the compulsion under which the arrangement was signed, pakistan performed its part and deposited in escrow the same specifid by the prim Minister of India.
Sardar Saukat Hayat in his book, The Nation That Lost Its Soul (20)
corroborates the broad facts of the whole sordid mess with additional information:-
“The Division of Asset committee had been formed in East and West Punjab and met alternately at Lahore and jallandur, the temporary capital of East punjab. The rules were that, in case of differences between us, the case would be refereed to the Arbitral Tribunal headed by the Chief justice of India, Sir patrick Sens.
“The question of Division of water between Indian and pakistan punjab was to be decided at a meeting to be held in jallandur. I attended this particular meeting along with the secretary Cum Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department Mr.Abdul Hameed, and the chief secretary Hafiz Abdul Majeed ICS. We were accommodated in a ramshackle old hotel.
“The next day we had to tackle the matter of the division of water on which our economty entirely depended. We discussed it amongst our own party and came to the conclusion that even if we took this problem to the Arbitral Tribunal and got a favorable decision, how were we going to get it implemented when the Headworks had been unfairly allotted to India in the so-called Raccliffe Award Therefore, we decided that we should find a via media to share the expenses of running the Head works and part of the canal system located in the East punjab. The Hindus, after long discussion, came to an agreement. Alas, in keeping with their chanakian (Machiavellian) philosophy they reneged later, a day after the end of the Arbitral Tribunal. They stopped our share of water from the Head works at Madhopur feeding Barjdoab and from the Ferozepur Headwork which supplied water to Dipalpur Canal, irrigation the Montgomery area, and to the Bahawalpur Canal. This came as a deep shock to me.”
Sir Feroze Khan Noon in his book, from memory (21)
Inforduces yet another dimension to the sordid late:- (P-264)
International Cort of Justice at The Hague, because no Court could have denied s our riparian rights of the waters of the Eastern Rivers. But what is the use of winning suits in Court, if such a decision cannot be backed up by the physical power to enforce it?
The Indus Water Teaty, the negotiations for which had started in March 1952 under the aegis of World Bank (then known as International Bank for Reconstruction and development, IBRD), presented perhaps the last chance to correct the wrong committed during the previous two occasions. But that was not to be.
In 1951 Mr. David E. Lilienthal, former head of the, seven state Tennessee Vlley Authority (T.V.A), on the model of which WAPDA is established, visited India and pakistan. He recorded his observation in an article captioned “Another Korea in the Making?” which appeared in the 4th August 1951 issue of “Colliers” magazine. (22)
Mr. Lilienthal called the water dispute between India and pakistan “pure dynamite” and “a powder keg”. He warned that “peace in Indo-pak sub-continent is not in sight with these inflammables lying around” and that “these people will live or die by the way they handle the waters of Indus”.
He proposed “a joint use of this truly international river basin on an engineering basis” that would make the riparians work together on a “common project that is not political but functional, a part of life and based on technical skill and human need”
The project was proposed to be “jointly financed”, (perhaps with the help of World Bank) and the Indus River System was to be “developed as a unit --- disigned, built and operated as a unit, as is the seven-state T.V.A system bach in the U.S.A”.
The quantum of water that Mr.Lilienthal was referring to in the Indus River System and was to be divided by Indus Water Treaty was as follows:
Western Rivers (23) Eastern Vivers (24)
Indus 90 MAF Sutlej 14 MAF
Jehlum 23 MAF Beas 13 MAF
Chenab 26 MAF Ravi 3 MAF
Total 140 MAF or 80% Total 33 MAF or 20%
The break up of the 33 MAF of the Eastern rivers was: (25)
Quantum reaching pakistan 24 MAF
Indian canal withdrawals 9 MAF
Total 33 MAF
The cultivable area of the Indus Basin within paistan and india and that which was served with canal irrigation wa:- (26)
Pakistan
Million India
acres Pakistan
(Percentage) India
1 Cultivable area of indus Basin 74.8 7.6 91% 9%
2 Cultivable area served by 30.7 2.1 94% 6%
3 Remaining cultivable area within Indus Basin 44.1 5.5 88% 12%
The pakisntan delegation which had at least one member each from the riparian provinces of West pakistan along with members from Bahawalpur and Khairpur states, had an iron clad case in their favour. Though al! five Punjab rivers originated in India, the cultivable area of the Indus Basin in that country was only 9% out of which als only 6% was canal irrigated.
In stopping the waters flowing into Pakistan India was committing an act of grave provocation (27). It was claiming absolute sovereignty on the waters flowingy through its territory. But the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, also referred to as the Harmon Doctrine, was dead and buried by the end or 19th century (28), 50 years before India raised and utilized it. In these fifty years international law on the rights of riparian states on international rivers was evolving and taking shape. For example in the U.S.A which had 51 states then, and a number of inter-state rivers, the Supreme Court had adjudicated on a multilude of intricate disputes handing down brilliant and truly land mark decisions, the help of which could easily have been sought by the Pakistan delegation negotiationg with India under IBRD.
The case of Lac Lanoux is an apt example. River Carol crosses from France into the Spanish Pyrenees. In the early 1950s, France, asserting absolute sovereignty, proposed to divert water from the river at Font-Vine for hydropower generation. It offered to compensate Spain monetarily. Spain objected asserting that the riverine integrity (basin integrity) be kept supreme and its irrigation needs be given priority. Even when France agreed to divert back first the water needed for Spanish irrigation, and then all the diverted water, through a tunnel between watersheds, Spain insisted on absolute riverine integrity, claiming that it did not want French hands on the water tap. The arbitral tribunal ruled in 1957 that “Territorial integrity … must bend before all international obligation”. This ruling made possible the 1958 Lac Lanoux Treaty (revised in 1970), in which it is agreed that such water that is diverted out-of-basin for French hydropower generation, must be returned, in similar quantity, before the stream reaches Spanish territory.(29)
The astonishing letter of Mr.M.S Qureshi reads 30)
“Provincial consideration were allowed to influence judgement and action. Indus link was at first recommended to government without even a mention to any of the senior members of the delegation. The proposal was turned down by the government. It playd no part in our negotiations with the Indians or the bank. When the senior members were consulted, they unanimously opposed even a mention of the link. Mr.Hameed went to the extent of offering a bait to Mr. Hassan, representative of Bahawalpur that through such a link Bahawalpur canals at Sulemanki would receive Rabi supplies from the Indus. Mr. Hassan knew the position of supplies and as a matter of principle he refused to support him saying that he was there to fight the case of Pakistan and not of a particular province or state. Internal disputes were best left over to the future.
“In the same manner every attempt was made to throw out Sindh,s uses from the western tributaries. Incorrect calculations were embodied in the Pakistan plan to the effect that not only the allocations of the new barrages on the Indus would be met in April, May but that there would be surplus left over for development. Both Mr.Hassan and myself disagreed and Mr. Tiptons calculations supported our conclusion that in actuality in most of the years there would be shortages. After much persuasion and addendum was issued by Mr. Hameed showing the serious nature of shortages in these months.
“Mr.Hameed regarded Pakistan,s waters as though they were his personal property. At first his secretary Mr. Khalilur Rehman who is supposed to be the custodian of his inner feelings, started belittling allocation and saying that ultimately these rights would be given up I protested to Mr.Hameed against this Loose talk and made it very clear that not a single drop of allocated supplies will be parted with.
“Later Mr. Hameed told Mr.Sarwar Jan Khan that for sake of an agreement he would even give up allocations and the same day he told Mr. Hassan that he would even agree to marhutunnel if Pakistan was given control over that strip of land. It did not bother Mr.Hameed whether this additional diversion of water by India did any damage to Pakistan.
“The Pakistan Designer (Mr.Hameed) also unfortunately failed to their confidence of the senior members of the delegation. It may be recalled here that Mr.Hameed happened to be the senior most Muslim enginer in the Punjab at the time of partition. He failed to put up the case of division of waters to the Paartition Committee and later before the arbitral tribunal. It was he who without any consultation with his government on the waters of Ravi and Sutlej undertook seigniorage charges. He therefore was very keen to reach an agreement at all costs. The senior members of the delegation on the other hand insisted upon acting on the advice of Honourabl Mr. Mohammed Ali Finance Minister who on the 2nd September 1953 advused as fikkiws:
“The delegation should be reasonable but at the same time should never give up merely for the sake of agreement more than was in Pakistan,s long term interest to vive up. The delegation should be reasonable but firm”.
“There was thus a difference in outlook which was no very conducive to good team work.
“Mr.Naseer,s pleading with General Wheeler that they could not afford to go back without an agreement only convinced the bank that Pakistan would accept anything for the sake of agreement.
“Even this most detrimental proposal seemed most palatable to Mr.Hamee. His secretary (Mr.Khalilur Rehman) and he hiself agreed with Mr.Sarwar Jan Khan on about the 1st April 1954 that no decision could be expected from a government that was tottering.
“Decision might as well be taken in Washington and the responsibility would not be that of the Engineers but of someone else. Perhaps he referred to Mr.Naseer Ahmed.
“Mr. Sarwar Jan Khan ridiculed any such venture as being absolutely beyond their jurisdiction”.
The desperation shown by the members from Punjab to reach an agreement (as indicated by Mr.M.S.Qureshi) and the intense difference of opinion among members of Pakistan delegation must have made the Indians ecstatic.
Whth the advantage of hind sight it can safely be said that the politicians of India and the senior irrigation officials, then, must have easily analysed the political situation of West Pakistan and the out come of the “parity” drive with the Eastern Wing. It is equally safe to say that they must have known who will wield the power and the privilege in the about-tobecome political unity of West Pakistan.
They delayed the negotiation sufficiently, aided by the dithering Pakistan delegation, till One Unit was proclaimed on 15th Oct 1955 effectively merging all four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan) and federal capital (then Karachi) into a single province, West Pakistan.
Needless to say that the negotiating team was disbanded and a fresh negotiating team constituted under the name of Indus Basin Advisory Board (IBAB). All pesky members from smaller provinces were dropped and following members, all, without exception, from Punjab, included:-(31)
Mr G.Mueenudin
K.B.M.Adbul Hameed C.E Punjab
Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman
Mr.S.Kirmani
Mr.S.I.Mehboob
Mr.S.M.Niaz
Mr. Altaf Hussain
In the presentation before justice Fazle Akber in 1971, the agent of Sindh, AWF Shaikh commenting on this team, said (32), “Sir, at that time, Mr.A.R.Kazi S.Q.A, (presently chief Engineering advisor to Government of Pakistan) who is the senior-most civil Engineer serving in Pakistan, was chief Engineer (Water) WAPDA, but it was unfortunate for Sindh that he was not included in the IBAB. His inclusion was all the more necessary because it was WAPDA which had to get the works constructed as an Agent to central Government. It is surprising that Junior Executive Engineers and superintending Engineers of Pnjab Service were included but an Engineer of such a high calibre and status was not included simply because… I need not elabrate the inference which is there”.
As was expected, Indus Water Treaty was signed on 19th Sept 1960 in Karachi by the president of Pakistan (Ayub Khan) and Prime Minister of India (Jawahir Lal Nehru) surrendering Pakistan’s right on the three eastern tributaries of Indus. Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, in return for 175 million dollars from India. Another $ 150 million were granted by other countries and World Band loaned $ 150 million to construct Mangla dam on Jehlum, along with a number of link canals, as replacement works to drain water of Indus and Jehlum into the dry beds of the three eastern tributaries. All details of the Treaty and the financial arrangements were finalized by the IBAB.
Some very disturbing question’s remain in th IBAB decision of signing Indus Water Treaty:-
1. Why was India, which had 9% cultivable area and only 6% canal irrigated land of Indus Basin, given 33 MAF or 20% water of Indus River System? The result can be seen 40 years later that India has taken the hage 18500 Cusic Rajasthan canal from the Harike barrage at the confluence of rivers Sutlej and Beas.
2. What was the secret agreement mentioned by Shaukat Hayat Khan when he writes that, “therefore we decided that we should find a via media to share the expenses of running the Head Works and part of the canal system located in the East Punjab. The Hindus, after long discussion came to an “agreement”. Alas, in keeping with their Chanakian (Machiavelian) philosophy they reneged later” (34).
At what levd was This agreement authorized and by whom? Was the federal government consulted and where is the record of such consultation and authorization?
3. Was it a conspiracy conceived and orchestrated by the west Punjab’s official and politicians by means of which Sindh, which was a co-sharer of the eastern tributaries, was sidelined and the historic conflict between Sindh and Punjab was turned into a quarrel between East Punjab and west Panjab, and then between India and Pakistan?(35)
Was it a continuation of the thought prevalent in those early days of Pakistan that the struggling new state would not survive and therefore the opportunity be availed by which, before the two states merged again to become one whole India, Sindh Punjab dispute was settled by dividing the waters of the eastern tributaries between the two Panjabs leaving Sindh out cold and dry?
4. Looking at the chain of events starting from the removal of the item of assessment of irrigation assets from the of agenda of Committee
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